

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE  
SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR  
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE  
MR. MIR HOSSEIN MOUSAVI'S  
VOTES

---



**Illegal propaganda by using government and public sources and facilities:**

1. According to article 68 law of the Islamic republic of Iran's presidential election : “committing any campaign activities for or against the presidential candidates during the Friday prayers tribune or in any other way which has formal and public meaning and the activity of employees during their administrative hours and using the facilities, ministries, departments, and governmental institutions affiliated with the government and institutes which are using the public's budget (for whatever said amount) from the date which the names of candidates are announced, are strictly banned and any such perpetrators will be considered guilty.” this includes any administrations and government organizations and their employees with regard to announcing their positions. They are not allowed to give manifestos, statements, and placards for or against any of the presidential candidates.

2. Unfortunately in this election, explicit, wide and shameless violations of article 68 of election laws were committed by the use of government and public sources and facilities. There was also clear interference by government employees, senior managers, governors, and executive managers for the benefit of the winning party.

2.1 Mr. Ahmadinejad used government facilities for most of his campaign trips and specifically different levels of government officials such as governors, governors' assistants, generals, top managers of governmental jobs, chiefs of administrations, misusing the power of his administration for the purpose of gathering supporters from government employees, schools, factories, and members of various Islamic groups.

2.2 Mr. Ahmadinejad misused the government airplane during his trip to Oromieh, Tabriz, Ardabil and Esfahan.

2.3 Mr. Ahmadinejad misused government facilities and the powers of the government by gathering generals and governors and organizing different meetings in several provinces and villages, in the name of investigating local problems and using

government resources not available to other candidates thusly in encouraging these villagers and others to vote for him.

2.4 Another case of violating article 68 of election law is allowing the travel of government employees for the sole purpose of campaigning for Mr. Ahmadinejad and use of government facilities during these trips. These trips were taken by the following individuals: Mr. Parvis Davoodi, the first assistant to the president; Mr. Saeedlou, the executive assistant to the president; Mr. Mottaki, the Iranian foreign minister to such cities as Zanjan, Semnan, Illam, and Sanghar, among others. These illegal trips also included lectures by the ministry of transportation and the poorly timed opening of Esfahan, Shiraz and Zahedan and Bam railways. These trips were all in clear violation of election laws.

2.5 Use of public and government resources and facilities, including lecturers/speakers, different levels of government officials such as governors, governors' assistants, generals, top managers of government jobs, chiefs of administrations, were used for the purpose of campaigning for Mr. Ahmadinejad. Most of these government officials were given gifts by mr.ahmadinejad.

2.6 State-wide efforts of government ministers and officials on behalf of Mr. Ahmadinejad were made, and in doing so, open misuse of public facilities have occurred. Also, additional attempts to silence all election-monitoring bodies in this situation were made as an unseen determination in selecting Mr. Ahmadinejad became clear. Hence, the will of the masses in the presidential election results was nullified and it seems that the decision was made prior to all proceedings that Mr. Ahmadinejad would be chosen rather than elected in this presidential election. This conclusion can be extracted from the quotes related to the supreme leader, Mr. Khamenei, even as he denied the inference from his quotes and his lectures. Nonetheless, the united efforts of all the government's men are a testament to his true beliefs.

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

2.7 Summoning of all the employees of the department of public health administration and educational departments to extraordinary ceremonies and ordering them to appear in these ceremonies held in honor of the aforementioned incumbent.

2.8 Opening of construction projects in the defined period of election activities and using these projects for campaigning for the incumbent.

3 violation of neutrality required for all the candidates in Iranian television "Seda Sima" and using the facilities of state run media, which were using public and governmental budgets, in violation of this election.

3.1 Many and wide ranging violations of "Seda Sima" in the period of campaigning in this presidential election cycle, as determined by the supervisory committee of "Seda Sima" and also the organization of election inspectors of Iran.

3.2 Favoring and open campaigning of newspapers such as Keyhan, Iran, Javan (and many other government funded newspapers as well as government funded news agents such as Irana, Borna, Fars, Pana, etc.) For the incumbent were noted by the election monitoring organization of the country.

3.3 Use of "Seda Sima" before the elections as well as after, used solely for the benefits of one special ruling candidate is clear. We strongly recommend any and all well known independent experts to study and review the details and expose the truth behind this misuse and the unfairness of this election and in reviewing the details of this campaign, to define how unfair the media was used for the victory of the incumbent.

**Bribing the voter and buying the votes:**

1. According to article 25 of Iranian laws of presidential election votes which are bought are considered false, but will be counted with the overall number of votes. Also, according to the article 33 of this law, "threatening or bribing" for election matters is a crime and if the violation of this law deviates the election flow in one or some of the registration branches from the legal path and may change the results, the procedures will be announced from the country ministry to the central control committee for review within body known as the guardians counsel /committee.

**Allurement and Pay for Vote**

According to article (25) of the Islamic Republic of Iran's legal statute for presidential elections, "votes obtained by purchase" are void, but are still considered as part of the total number of votes cast. Also, article (33) of the same law considers "threat or allurement in election" as a crime and "if in one or more registration and voting centers such crimes—mentioned in the said article—take place so that the lawful process of elections and general results thereof are affected, the internal ministry shall report them to the "central overseeing board" for setting forth necessary complaints to the "Guardian Council".

Right from the outset of these presidential elections, Mr. Ahamdinejad has misused public funds and government resources to lure people and/or pay for votes in his own favor:

2.1 Paying 80,000 Tomans as "justice shares interest" to six of four and half million people under the cover-title of "Aid Organizations" (Aid Committee, Organization of Better living and Warriors) and more than 5,200,000 villagers, to a total of approximately 6,800,000 voters.

2.2 Hasty enforcement of the "Civil Services Management Law" after 1.5 years of delay and payment of related salary increments in the time of election campaign.

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

2.3 Enforcement of salary increment to the retiree, at the outset of elections.

2.4 Cash payments at the time of election campaign to those people who had submitted letters to the government executives during their trips to various states / provinces, asking for aid.

2.5 Cash payments, coins, bonuses and the like to different groups such as nurses, students, members of Rural Islamic Councils, some of the government managers and employees, etc.

2.6 Distribution of free potato in different areas of the country.

2.7 Distribution of 60,000 to 80,000 Tomans and bonuses to villagers a few days before the Election Day.

2.8 Distribution of money by Counties and "Aid Committees", especially in rural areas.

2.9 Distribution of rice, flour, cooking oil, etc. in areas with poor population and inviting them to vote for Mr. Ahamdinejad.

**Violation and Criminal Acts by Mr. Ahmadinejad Personally:**

Based on Article 116 of the Islamic Republic Constitution and also Article 35 of Presidential Election Law, the president must possess "good records, honesty, and virtue." In addition, according to Article 113 of the Constitution, the president is the head of executive branch (except in affairs that are directly related to the Supreme Leader) and is responsible for the execution of the Constitution. According to Article 121 of the Constitution, the president takes oath in front of the Islamic Republic Parliament to protect the Constitution, to devote himself in promotion of religion and ethics, to keep away from any kind of dictatorship, and to advocate the freedom, dignity, and rights of the people as given in the Constitution.

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

During the election campaign, especially in television debates, Mr. Ahmadinejad has slandered a number of individuals and personalities with big accusation in their absence and without them being present to have the right to defend themselves. According to the clear statement of the honorable head of the “Judiciary Branch” and the honorable Attorney General, those statements have been clear examples of criminal act. These accusations, unethically and irrelevantly, provided the main front for Mr. Ahmadinejad’s campaign slogans against other candidates (in particular Mr. Mousavi), basically in an attempt to change the direction of voting (one of the reasons for the elections annulment). A number of grand religious figures have announced this act as religiously unlawful. In the additional television time granted to him, Mr. Ahmadinejad still insisted on what he had said before and added even more to his previous accusations with no heed to the Supreme Leader’s hints (as announced in the Friday’s prayer)

Tens of times, in TV advertisements, debates, and other occasions, Mr. Ahmadinejad has said incorrect statements, delivered false figures/consensus, and uttered false accusations and slander. These show the very characteristics of the loss of “honesty and virtue” which, according to the law, are part of the conditions for an eligible presidential candidate.

In his TV debates, Mr. Ahmadinejad has accused unseen elements of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Ministry of the Interior in organizing thugs to attack the youth and the people, to cut their neckties, and to shave their heads. These—if occur -are obviously criminal acts. But these are unfounded accusations and have never been investigated by any judicial body.

It is surprising that the Guardian Council which in the past has disqualified hundreds of the candidate in the parliament elections with petty excuses, has voided the election results with such excuses like luring (for instance just a lunch), considers it its own right to revise and change its own rules—if it sees necessary—at any stage of the elections, does the so-called neutralizing violations by voiding the elections or election boxes,

BUT, in the case of Mr. Ahmadinejad, it has been silent about all the violations from the Constitution (as mentioned before, such as the condition of honest and virtue), whereas according to Article (58) of the Presidential Election Laws, it has been its duty to disqualify Mr. Ahmadinejad.

**Organizing the Ministry of Interior, Election Headquarters, and Enforcing Boards in a closed impenetrable way all over**

One of the evidences of the overall engineering of votes in the presidential election has been the total quarantine-like structure of the interior ministry (all the way to the lowers ranks), the election headquarters, and the enforcing boards.

1.1 Selection of Mr. Ahmadinejad's old friend and colleague, closest consultant, and prejudiced and open supporters, who was also the head of election headquarters in the 1384(2005) presidential election as the Minister of Interior.

1.2 Selection of one of the most prejudiced and active elements of Mr. Ahamdinejad's campaigners in 1384(2005) elections as the head of the election headquarter of the whole country during this election cycle.

1.3 Extensive cherry picking of state-, country-, district-governors, etc. during the course of the last four years and their perpetual replacement until they match to what is desirable. This has caused us to end up with 25 military governors at the time when the presidential election began.

1.4 Obvious bias of the Ministry of the Interior and the head of the election national headquarters with the head of the ninth administration in the public media at the outset of the elections.



DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

1.5 Total homogeneity of election and political managers in the chain of order in headquarters and ministry of the interior. Elimination of all the most experienced in such positions intensifies the index of collusion and misdeed in the elections. All the state-, country-, district-governors as well as members of enforcing and inspection boards have had identical political opinions and way of thinking in advocating Mr. Ahmadinejad.

1.6 Abrupt replacement of all the employees and experts in the interior ministry office for elections with individuals from outside the ministry.

1.7 Changing those in charge of vote counting sites of the Ministry of the Interior.

1.8 Total homogeneity of members in the enforcing boards, so that even the trustee who must have been chosen by the town and district council had to go through the Guardian Council selection process – according to the wrong opinion of Mr. Kadkhodai.

1.9 The homogeneity even extended to members of vote-casting stations and they eliminated as much as they could those whom they recognized as “strangers.” In many occasions active members of Mr. Ahmadinejad’s headquarter were employed.

2. Filtering and homogenization in the national-election-headquarter personnel along with a encapsulated, non-transparent, and security enforce police state environment is one of the ostensible evidences of non-partiality of the administrators and makes them suspicious of engineering the process of elections.

2.1 Despite several requests, the interior minister did not set even one meeting with the representatives of various election headquarters

2.2 In many occasions when Mr. Ahamdi (the liaison of Mr. Mousavi’s headquarters) contacted the ministry to discuss issues related to the elections, he was told that the officers have a meeting outside the ministry!! This becomes more plausible

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

when attention is paid to the news that said meetings were being held outside the ministry with attending individuals who legally had no assignment in the election (specifically after the polls showed Mr. Mousavi's votes above 50%)

2.3 By using every trick in the book such as reference to Mr. Kadkhdei's letter (which has no legal validity), representatives of presidential candidates were prevented of entering to the enforcing boards' meetings. This is direct violation of the law and enforcing regulations ratified by the government.

2.4 Creation of a closed system limited to a few special individuals selected from the enforcing and inspection people. Example: on the Election Day, only Mr. Mahsooli (a student) and another person were present in the general collection room of the election headquarters, and the representatives of the candidates had no access and could not even get near this room.

In addition to reporting the mentioned happenings regarding the irregularities to responsible authorities such as the Guardian Council, Ministry of Interior, Heads of the Forces, and the Assembly of Discernment for the Good of the Establishment, on 1388/3/14 (6/14/09) a letter signed by Mr. Mousavi and Hojatoleslam Karoobi was sent to the Supreme Leader asking him to have the Interior Ministry and the Guardian Council follow and enforce the law. Skepticism about the soundness of the election was also mentioned in the same letter, but unfortunately it had no effect and the same process continued in practice.

A submission was made to the Supreme Leader, signed by Mr. Mousavi and Mr. Karoubi, seeking that his Excellency ask both the Ministry of the Interior and the Guardian Council to obey the Law. Their submission raised doubts about the accuracy of the election process. Nevertheless, the election process remain questionable and without change.

**Violation of neutrality by the Guardian Council, the Supervisory Committee and the observers:**

1. Under Section 99 of the Constitution and under the Guardian Council Supervisory Act, the following procedures must be followed during a Presidential election:
  - The Guardian Council is responsible for closely supervising the election.
  - The core Supervisory Committee of the Guardian Council must be responsible for every stage of the election; ensuring that all legal procedures are met and that the Ministry of the Interior and the Executive Committees of the elections perform their duties accurately.
  - The Guardian Council has the right to annul or stop the election should there be any confirmed infraction in all or part of the country. Such a decision is definite and no other authority can annul or stop an election as such.
2. As per Section 99 of the Constitution and sections 73 and 93 of the Presidency Election Act and the 12 sections of the Guardian Council Supervisory Regulations, the accuracy of elections is dependant upon the neutral state of the Guardian Council, the core Supervisory Committee and its observers. Their observational duties must be strictly carried out, according to the law.
3. As a result of the members of the Guardian Council's support of Mr. Ahmadinejad, the Council has therefore, not been neutral in its evaluation of the election:
  - Ayatollah Janati has supported Mr. Ahmadinejad in many of his speeches, including the Tehran Friday public prayer.
  - Ayatollah Yazdi has defended Mr. Ahmadinejad as opposed to the defiant clergy committee and the Qum clergy instructor's society, even announcing the non-support of such societies as being reasonably and religiously not allowed.
  - Ayatollah Momen and Ayatollah Moddares Yazdi have supported Mr. Ahmadinejad, along with the Qum clergy instructor's society.
  - Ayatollah Kaabi has also defended Mr. Ahmadinejad on many occasions and cannot be considered a neutral actor.

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

- Mr. Elham, a Guardian Council law expert, has also been in the front line of Mr. Ahmadinejad's electoral campaigns (and at the Tehran prayer place public support meetings). He additionally supported Mr. Ahmadinejad by acting as the government's spokesperson and reporter.
  - Mr. Azizi, another Guardian Council law expert, is also the President's deputy and has defended Mr. Ahmadinejad in many cases and cannot be considered a neutral actor.
  - Although Mr. Kadkhodaei is not a member of the Guardian Council, his influence in the council cannot be concealed. He has also defended Mr. Ahmadinejad in multiple cases. Additionally, he has issued an illegal election bulletin that has prevented the remaining candidates from having a member in the executive committee.
  - A total of seven members of the Council have openly supported Mr. Ahmadinejad and have in some cases, even made supporting speeches or trips.
4. The core Supervisory Committee of the Guardian Council has selected the members of the Supervisory Committee and the Guardian Council's observers from a certain political wing over the last few years. As the entire Supervisory Committee is from a certain political wing, there have always been concerns surrounding their support of a certain candidate. In spite of the severe limitations of Mr. Mousavi's representatives attending the election sites and their means of communication for the purpose of reporting any possible infraction, there have been multiple reports of non-neutral observance and the involvement of officials in favor of a certain candidate (Mr. Ahmadinejad).
5. The Guardian Council and the core Supervisory Committee have not performed a thorough observation of the tenth presidential election:

5.1 The Ministry of the Interior's violations to the Act in relation to the process of counting and announcing the result of the election has been treated with indifference and non-involvement by the Guardian Council. In spite of the Election Act and the

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

executive regulations that strictly prescribe procedures for the regional counting of votes in the presence of candidates' representatives, counting was undertaken without any such presence and the results were reported to the Ministry of the Interior directly. The results were then added and announced without any representative present. All the representatives' complaints in relation to such violations have been administered by the core Supervisory Committee of the Guardian Council.

5.2 In spite of the common procedures, the announcement of the results was performed without any coordination from the Guardian Council. This was also permitted by the Guardian Council.

The supplement and distribution of more than 100,000 electoral stamps (almost twice the needed amount) was also surprisingly allowed by the Guardian Council, with no objection.

5.3 - In response to the baseless accusations and false contentions raised and alleged by Mr. Ahmadinejad in the televised presidential debates and to the misuse of government resources and capacities for bribing voters -- which are criminal acts and clear instances for invalidating Mr. Ahmadinejad's qualification for holding the presidential office -- the Guardian Council has adopted a policy of silence and indifference, and has not acted according to its supervisory duties.

5.4 - The issuance of millions of ballots in excess of the number of eligible voters, alongside ballot shortages in a considerable number of voting polls, were not met with the appropriate reaction from this supervisory authority.

5.5 - On Saturday June 13 2009, the speaker of the Guardian Council, whose biased position in support of a certain candidate is obvious, declared, before any of the

other candidates' complaints had been submitted to the Council, that the June 12 election had been one of the cleanest elections, with the least number of reported infringements (quoted *non verbatim*).

6. Considering the above points, since the Tenth Presidential Election was effectively held in the absence of supervision as required by the constitution and the other mentioned legal articles; it is practically invalidated and lacks legitimacy.

**The unprecedented political alignment of the supervisory and the executive election authorities**

1. In Iran, the election framework is based on two pillars: The Ministry of the Interior (the Election Headquarters; and the Executive Committees) and the Guardian Council (the Supervisory Committees). There is no third party involved, and the role of the candidates' observers is quite marginal and highly vulnerable.

2. In the past 30 years, the executive and the supervisory authorities have always belonged to different political affiliations. This guaranteed the relative fairness of the elections. In other contexts however, where one side was dominant (e.g., in pre-election disqualifications), this fairness would be greatly harmed.

3. For the first time in 30 years, the executive and the supervisory authorities were aligned in their political affiliations and in their support of a certain candidate, and this, more than ever, cast doubt on the fairness of the election and the trustworthiness of the election officials.

4. Furthermore, the executive and the supervisory authorities harbored certain views according to which the public vote was a mere ornament and a support for the regime,

and not the people's right and the source of the regime's legitimacy. They had furthermore portrayed their rival's victory before their supporters as grounds for the spread of irreligiousness, financial corruption and foreign dominance.

Considering the ample evidence, it is therefore acceptable for us to believe in the major widespread rigging of the popular vote in this election.

**Military intervention in elections :**

1. Based on the order of Imam Khomeini (*R.H.*), Article 49 of the Disciplinary Code of Standards, and Article 40 of Law of Offences of the Armed Forces; intervention by military forces in an election is prohibited and considered a criminal offense. Examples of the prohibition of military intervention are as follows:

1.1 The use of Corps (i.e. Islamic Republic Guards Corps - IRGC) facilities for or against political parties, factions, groups, organizations and election candidates for the presidency of the republic.

1.2 Commissioning and management of any type of meeting, gathering, and promotional speech for or against any candidate, faction, group or political organization.

1.3 Invitation of members or officials of political organizations and candidates to Corps centers.

1.4 Propaganda for or against any election candidate, group, faction, political party organization; and the distribution, installation, removal or shredding of their announcements, pictures, posters or placards. Similarly, distribution of tapes, CDs and other such items for any staff of the Special Corps and Basij is prohibited.

1.5 Interference in elections under the pretense of supervision and inspection; and membership in the executive and supervisory boards, without any actual co-ordination or instruction from the Organization.

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

1.6 Any kind of intervention in the affairs of the electorates and the imposition of personal opinion and actions upon legal duties or process.

1.7 Creation of confrontation and disruption of speeches; and also the use of official title, rank, or position as well as threats, and encouragement of people for or against any group, faction or candidate.

1.8 Any sort of statement for or against any election candidate by the Corps and Basij staff, who are guardians of the ballot boxes.

1.9 Preparation of petitions and signatures for or against any group, faction or candidate.

1.10 – Installation of photos, placards, banners, posters, advertising announcements for election candidates belonging to any group, faction or political organization, in the facilities of the Corps and Basij or vehicles belonging to the Corps.

1.11 Any undertaking which would amount to acceptance of entrance into activism, programs and promotion of candidates, parties or groups: such as participation in gatherings, public and private meetings; interactions with elections staff; and media related activities, such as publishing written works on any subject; and the distribution or sale of such magazines and/or published books.

2. Also, in accordance with Article 24 of the Election Law for the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the military and security forces do not have the right to interfere in the Supervisory and Executive affairs of elections.

3. In very widely distributed election bulletins from Yalsarat Husayn of 'Ansar-e Hezbollah' to the personnel of the Corps, Basij and armed forces, Gen. Sardar Pakpoor asks for guidance from Hojjatoleslam Saeidi, the representative of the Vali-e Faghih (Rule of the Jurisprudence) for the Corps regarding the Presidential elections, with the response that: "The explicit view of the great leader the Holy Ayatollah Khamenei, is the



re-election of the respectable president of the Republic, His Excellency Mr. Dr. Ahmadinejad. It is incumbent upon the respectable commanders of the ground forces of the Corps to act in accordance with the repeated guidance of His Holiness, and to convince the personnel under their command and especially the brothers of duty". These bulletins, in addition to violating the aforementioned laws intended for the prevention of the interference of the armed forces in elections and the taking of factional positions, have in effect, created the grounds for a multitude of interferences, and the subversion of the Corps and Basij during elections.

4. Despite the legal prohibition of military intervention in the free elections of the people, and despite official announcements by the IRGC and security forces specifically in relation to non-interference in the elections, widespread interference in the elections from the aforementioned organizations has occurred. Widespread use of the facilities of the Corps and security forces for the advertisement of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for the conduct of political meetings, advertising and electioneering conferences - with the justification of encouragement of military personnel for participation in the elections, but effectively advertising for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad while portraying the victory of Mr. Mousavi as perilous for the country (the widely heard speeches of Mr. Saeedi and Zavalnoor Masoul); the replacement of the office of the representative of the Rule of the Jurisprudence (the Supreme leader) to the Revolutionary Guard Corps; the analysis of the political nature of the Corps as reflected in the bulletins, samples of which are available; and the position adopted during the IRGC's weekly Truthful Morning (Sobhe Sadeq) in the months of April, May and June; in summation, all constitute a violation of the laws banning military intervention.

In the Revolutionary Guards' analysis, Mr. Ahmadinejad's opponents were portrayed as agents of foreign powers for inciting a "velvet revolution" in Iran (speech by Mr. Saeidi, reported in the *Weekly Political Analysis* publication, published by the Political Bureau of the Guards' Joint Chiefs of Staff).

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

The daily publication of the *Vali-e Faqih's* (the Supreme Leader's) representative in the Guards, by juxtaposing news pieces from daily papers such as *Kayhan*, *Javan*, and *Iran*, had been effectively supporting Ahmadinejad and had been accusing Ahmadinejad's opponents of supporting groups and parties which do not believe in the regime ("Selected News" section of the special election issue of this daily, Political Office of the *Vali-e Faqih's* Representative, May 12, 2009 and June 9, 2009).

5. Unequivocal statements and blatant interventions by some of the Guards and Basij officials in favor of Mr. Ahmadinejad and against Mr. Mousavi, portraying his victory as a "velvet revolution" which they will not allow to happen, and the extensive psychological warfare campaign which the staff and subordinate members of these organs carried out before and after the election day in various parts of the country – dozens of instances have been reported to us from the provinces. These constitute further evidence that strengthens the suspicion of a predetermined decision and the determination of "the election's victor regardless of the voting outcome".

6. Illegal actions by the Police, the Guards and the Basij on the days prior to the election, such as the removal and confiscation of advertisement banners of the opponents of Mr. Ahmadinejad; attacks on campaign headquarters, including intimidations, insults, and beatings; advertisement by these organs, especially by their high-ranking officials, in favor of Mr. Ahmadinejad; collection of the birth certificates of conscripts in certain barracks; and distribution of books and publication of magazines and bulletins in favor of Mr. Ahmadinejad and against Mr. Mousavi.

7. Large-scale organization of Mr. Ahmadinejad's campaign rally in Tehran's *Mosalla* with the Guards' financial resources and the attendance of tens of thousands of Basijis in the rally in plain clothes. The planned attendance of Basijis in various campaign meetings in favor of Mr. Ahmadinejad were in some cases paid mission wages.

8. Illegal actions by the Police, the Guards and the Basij, on the day of the election, such as advertising for Mr. Ahmadinejad in polling stations; forcing voters to vote for Ahmadinejad; intimidation at many polls, villages and polling stations, casting of the ballots by Basij members who, by showing their Basij membership cards, had refused to have their birth certificates stamped; and intervention at polling stations.

9. The illegal actions of the police, "plain clothes" militia, the revolutionary guard and "basij" by attacking Mr. Mousavi's campaign headquarters on Gheytariye St. in the northern section of Tehran and other campaign offices as well as arresting their staff in order to prevent the flow of information and documenting election irregularities.

### **Deception and fraud in the ballot papers and the collecting of votes**

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran Presidential Election Law, Article 26 states: "the votes obtained by deception and fraud in paper ballots and votes" are void and will not be considered as part of the total votes cast. In addition, Article 33 states: "deception and fraud in ballot papers, votes or the minutes includes: "increasing or decreasing the number of ballot papers or votes cast", "changing, manipulating, forging, stealing or removing election documents such as ballot papers and votes", and "misplacing, maneuvering or destroying the election documents without legal authorization" is an offense. If such offenses occur in one or more registration centers or polling stations causing irregularities and influencing the overall outcome of the election, the Ministry of the Interior should inform the Observatory Central Board in charge of the elections who in turn notifies the Guardian Council.

2. One of the functions of the election law is to deal with the issue of paper ballots. These paper ballots play an important and vital role in a variety of ways. The total number of ballots printed and used in every election is based on the number of people eligible to vote determined by the Statistical Center of Iran and the Registration Council of the Population. To prevent shortage of the ballots a reasonable percentage is usually

added. Incompetence or errors or influence at this early stage, result in discrepancies that create doubts about the accuracy of the entire election process. In this election, the Statistical Center of Iran and the Registration Council of the Population had announced that the number of people eligible to vote was about 45,200,000. However, a total of 59,600,000 paper ballots with serial number were printed. These ballots were printed sequentially with consideration for identification numbers in 30 provinces around the country and were distributed in advance among the provinces based on their eligible voting population.

3. Based on announcements made by responsible officials in addition to confirmation by some members of the Guardian Council, on the day before the election, 88/03/21 (June 11, 2009), millions of additional ballots without serial numbers were printed at the Central Bank of Iran's publishing center. The printing of this many additional ballots especially without serial numbers despite the considerable number of previously printed ballots of more than 59 million, alone raises serious doubts about the election process and opens up much speculation.

It should be clarified:

3.1 What was the actual number of ballot papers printed on 88/03/21 (June 11, 2009) and how these ballots were distributed?

3.2 Those additional ballot papers without serial numbers were printed with the permission of Ayatollah Jannati. Neither the actual total number nor the location of their use of these additional ballots were clear and could not be legally justified or authorized.

3.3 What were the goals of the Ministry of the Interior in printing this many extra ballot papers without the provincial serial number?

3.4 Considering that there were no provincial serial number printed on these ballot papers raised the questions: what guidelines were used in the distribution process? How were these ballots used and controlled?

4. Regarding these printed paper ballots and the problems related to that, the following questions are also raised:

4.1 What was the basis for the printing of these ballots and what guidelines were used to distribute them between the provinces and the districts? Despite numerous and significant doubts that have been evident, why does the Ministry of the Interior not provide any reports explaining justification on this matter?

4.2 What was the reason behind the printing and the distribution of 22 to 32 million of additional ballots, which was more than what was actually needed? Why were they given to personnel in charge of administrating the election that is unprecedented during the past 30 years and the recent 29 elections?

4.3 Why, despite the millions of ballots originally printed and the millions of extra ballots also printed, did thousands of polling stations across various parts of the country, such as the provinces of Eastern Azerbaijan, Fars, Tehran and Lorestan, have insufficient ballots which caused the suspension of voting process as early as 10am?

4.4 Why were the ballots carried and distributed with negligence?

4.5 Is there not enough evidence from the points and questions stated above to reinforce the suspicion of widespread illegal activity and the existence of uncountable forged votes in the ballot boxes? In addition, the fact that the millions of extra ballots were used in a suspicious manner including the ballot boxes, especially in the mobile and "shadow" boxes indicate an "engineering of votes"?

All the above-mentioned questions raise legitimate doubts and point to a direct and deliberate "engineering of votes" that was set into process without any accountability or explanation.

### **Extra Seals**

1. In previous elections, normal standard practice is to prepare the election seals for the polling stations at a quantity equal to the number of polling stations plus 10% extra to accommodate any problems such as defective seals. The regular procedure was always to assign one seal to every ballot box.
2. In this election, about 100 thousands seals were prepared. This equals to twice the number of ballot boxes. This is far greater than any other election and goes against standard practice. This act is without legal justification and could have been the source of several forgeries.
3. The existence of more than 50 thousands extra election seals along with tens of millions of extra ballot papers reinforce the suspicion and explain the presence of millions of forged votes in the ballot boxes.

### **Obstructing and hindering the attendance of each candidate's representative at the polling stations**

1. Based on the Presidential Election Law articles, it specifies that attendance by representatives of the candidates at the polling stations are allowed and candidates can assign a representative at each polling station, as well as in the executive boards of the districts and the counties. These representatives can be present until the end of the election process including: the casting of the votes, counting votes, preparation of notes and minutes and can report violations in writing to the Guardian Council inspectors, the executive boards of the provinces, the district as well as the Ministry of the Interior and Election center. Preventing the presence of these representatives is considered to be a violation.

**Obstructing and hindering the attendance of each candidate's representative at the polling stations con't:**

2. Contrary to the law, Mr. Kadkhodai's answer to the question of this violation states that this question is invalid and has no grounds for a case.

3. Contrary to the law, governors and prefects of main or sub centers of the election were required to announce the establishment of executive groups in cities and sections from 1388-02-31(21-06-2009), which they did not. They were obliged to invite representative to be present, which they did not. These actions are in direct violation of the law and according to the law should carry penalties considered by legislators.

4. Based on the same electoral law, governors are required to deliver introduction letters informing the representatives to staff-nominated personnel to oversee at voting booths. This information was to be revealed in the relevant county at least 48 hours before vote day. This was not done. Abuse of this is also a violation.

5. The Ministry of the Interior officials and governorships has committed many violations by implementing the above-mentioned law. The required 48 hours was not honored. This caused much confusion on how to send documents and information required for issuance such letter or card. In many cases these problems were made apparent at the last moment.

6. Widespread reports of Web-registration with passwords that didn't work, forced the local voting branch staff to manually hand register. The office of the Supreme Leadership addressed this violation only in the last 48 hours.

7. Hundreds of people were not issued cards due to "alleged" defective documents and when the right documents were submitted they were still denied

8. The governors in direct violation of the law manipulated the list of people registered to observe the voting and in turn, the number of branches for determining voting observers

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

was changed. This is even after the acceptance between them and chairman of the committee that supervises and protects the votes and the office of Supreme Leadership. While the law is clear that representatives of the candidates for each branch can be introduced, the governors did not allow for this to happen.

9. The printed cards in some cases were unusable and ridden of errors. For example, in many cases the names were printed incorrectly or a picture of men were placed instead of women's and vice versa. Observers could not effectively be present at its branches at assigned polls.

10. In many cases PO-numbers that was introduced for the observer were different with the local PO-numbers; therefore they were not accepted. Observer presence and supervision became impossible.

11. In many cases introduction cards of the assigned observer for a determined candidate was sent to other observer of an opposing candidate. It was impossible to correct it because of the time constraints and last minute awareness of the issue.

12. Above actions caused the absence of over fifty percent of observers and representatives for Mir Hossein Mousavi in Tehran. In many cases they couldn't find the polling stations. Also many representatives had to travel long distances to reach their final destination, lacked proper instructions as to where to go. Thus it was impossible to ensure the funds or ballot boxes were empty before polling was to start.

13. In several cases observers at polling stations were expelled or denied permission for observation in direct violation of the law and it's pending penalties for violators.

14. Obstruction and blocking the main system of information transfer through phone and SMS messaging at the beginning hours of Election Day. In addition, the phone lines to the committee that supervises and protects votes were cut in the latter part of the day to prevent voter fraud reports.



**Lack of Ballots:**

1. Thousands of voting stations around the country, including the ones in the states of Eastern Azarbaijan, Fars, Tehran, and Lorestan ran out of ballots around 10-11 AM, which interrupted the voting process in those stations.
2. The distribution of ballots was suspiciously delayed despite the fact that millions of extra ballots were printed ahead of time for the major cities that expected larger than expected voter turnout such as Tabriz, Shiraz, north, east, and western parts of Tehran, This is the first time there has been such a delay in the past 30 years.
3. Other questions and concerns raised due to the shortage of ballots :
  - There is no explanation as to why hundreds of polling stations ran out of ballots at around 10-11 AM, halting the voting process for about 2 hours. Under the best of circumstances, each box can accommodate 100 votes per hour. Are we to assume that there were only 200-300 votes cast per box at these centers by the time they ran out of ballots or is there another explanation such as the possibility that the ballots were pre-filled with a candidate's name and placed in the box prior to the start of the voting process.
  - Was the ballot shortage caused by more than 100% voter turnout at some of the voting stations? This was not an isolated occurrence as it took place at hundreds of stations.
  - Was the ballot shortage engineered so that it would occur at polling stations where the majority of the voters were not supportive of Ahmadinejad?
  - The mismanagement of the voting process is a clear example of the government's abuse of power by giving a clear advantage to one candidate and group over others; and of committing fraud and engaging in criminal activity by creating fake ballots (section 2 of constitution rule 33), and by interfering in voting process (section 3 of constitution rule 34).

**Voting Process Misconduct:**

In addition to the various limitations imposed upon Mr. Mousavi's representatives at the stationary & mobile voting stations such as restrictions on their movement, disregard for their opinion about the voting process, disruption of communication, and unlawful prevention of representative's reporting from the voting polls; there are hundreds of other examples of government misconducts according to rules 19,24,25,26,29, and 33 of presidential election. Some examples are:

1. Voting stations clerks and the representatives of the Guardian Counsel present at the voting stations continued to promote Mr. Ahmadinejad during the voting process. These actions are illegal, affect the results; and demonstrate the bias of both the election station clerks and overseers towards Mr. Ahmadinejad's government and the possibility of fraud.
2. Failure to ensure that sealed and unsealed ballots boxes were empty prior to the start of voting process. This is one of the major disputes in this election and could be the root of widespread fraud. There is no confidence that the boxes were not stuffed with ballots and that the eventual results were pre-determined. Many of the candidate's representatives could not be present prior to the start of the voting process due to a number of issues such as delayed entrance, or were unlawfully denied access to the stations; therefore they could not ensure that the ballot boxes were empty prior to the start of voting process.
3. Multiple voting, giving several ballots to individual voters, not stamping birth certificates of the voter, allowing votes without requiring birth certificates and voting without National Registration Card, etc.
4. Casting votes with questionable birth certificates, or birth certificates belonging to persons other than the voters.

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

5. Threats and intimidation directed at voters at polling stations and surrounding areas by military forces or those acting under their orders and hinting at problematic outcomes in the event of Ahmadinejad's defeat.
6. Buying and selling of votes and identification cards.
7. Relocation, changing of identification numbers, and breaking of seals on ballot boxes.
8. Removal or disappearance of ballot forms, removal of ballot stubs from polling stations, and existence of ballot stubs with serial numbers that did not correspond to that of the ballot boxes they were in.
9. Lack of official electoral stamps on ballots and disappearance or removal of electoral stamps from the polling stations.
10. Votes being cast outside voting stations and ballot slips being filled on behalf of others.
11. Allowing ineligible voters to cast votes, such as underage minors.
12. Failure to remove Ahmadinejad campaign material from polling stations.
13. Rigging the vote count; namely, changing code 4 to 44.
14. Expulsion of Mousavi's representatives from many polling stations before starting the vote count, or sealing the ballot boxes and thus increasing the possibility of votes being counted in favor of the incumbent.
15. Lack of supervision over the reporting process at polling stations, and lack of supervision over the process of matching the exact number of counted ballots with the corresponding reports.

**Portable Polling Stations**

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

1. Shortly before the elections, it was announced that the Ministry of the Interior intended to have 14,000 (fourteen thousand) portable polling stations, which accounted for approximately one-third of total polling stations. This showed a clear intent for widespread rigging, since the mobility of portable polling stations makes them more difficult to monitor. Mr. Mousavi's Vote Protection Committee strongly protested these conditions, but was ignored by electoral officials and overseeing bodies.
2. Electoral law provides for portable polling stations only in inaccessible, hard to reach, and mountainous areas, and 24-hour establishments like hospitals and prisons, where the establishment of stationary (i.e., regular polling stations) is not possible. However, it was observed that portable polling stations were set up in many main streets and squares of cities where there were regular polling stations in the vicinity.
3. Contrary to clear guidelines set forth by the Elections Law, requiring the presence of candidates' representatives at portable and regular polling stations, most portable polling stations were not monitored by candidates' representatives. The representatives who were to be present at portable polling stations were either disqualified by district administrators or prevented from following the portable stations on their various stops.
4. The vote counts announced by the Ministry of the Interior also show that despite the engineering of the votes in all ballot boxes—whether stationary or portable—portable ballot boxes show a considerable and meaningful difference in favor of Mr. Ahmadinejad. In other words, the scope of infringements and fraud in portable ballot boxes has been far greater than in stationary ones.
5. The disappearance of a number of portable ballot boxes and their discovery after several hours in unexpected locations. By examining the vote count of these boxes, taking account of the demographic composition of the locations where they traveled and the voting history of these locations, reveals the reality of those votes.

### **Restrictions on the Voting Period and Illegal Obstruction of the Voting Process**

1. The voting period is legally designated to last 10 hours, and the Ministry of the Interior has the authority to extend this time period. In previous terms, the voting period for the first stage of the elections was extended by the Ministers of Interior for two hours throughout the country. For polling stations in densely populated areas, the time period was extended for 4 hours (that is, until 10 PM). In addition, the Ministry of the Interior and the Election Headquarters were careful to ensure, via repeated announcements to provincial governors and district administrators, that it was only when the voting supervisors were confident that all voters had left the polling station could the polls be closed and vote counting begun.

During this year's elections, however, despite unprecedented voter turnout and even the Supreme Leader's message to the Minister of Interior, the Minister—coerced by the President and certain members of the Guardian Council—refused to extend the voting period. The time management of the election reflects the Minister of the Interior's failure to meet his managerial duties, and his partisan abuse of authority.

2. It is unclear why authorities were in such haste to end this year's voting period—particularly in view the unprecedented voter turnout (which is public knowledge and statistically documented), and despite the shortage of ballot slips in some areas, which prevented those votes from being cast.

According to numerous reports, authorities turned away voters waiting in long lines outside polling stations, and turned out those voters already present inside the stations, by telling them that the voting period had ended (in the meanwhile, National Radio and Television reports were announcing the contrary). Yet electoral regulations and the rule of law dictate that polls must remain open until that last voter has cast their ballot and left the premises. (Paragraphs 1-5 of the Executive Statute of the Elections Law)

According to Article 6 of the Iran Constitution, the governance of national affairs must be decided by public vote, which is the natural right of all citizens. The Minister of Interior's

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

decision regarding extensions to the voting period is not a question of personal preference—the decision must be a response to prevailing conditions such that no citizen is deprived of their rights at the voting booth.

3. Despite the fact that four of Mr. Mousavi's representatives went to the Ministry of the Interior to ask for an extension to the voting period (in accordance with prior legal procedures), the Minister refused to even meet with them. Thus the actions undertaken by Ministry of the Interior, and its haste in announcing election results, deprived many citizens of their voting rights.

4. It is a regrettable contradiction that while the gentlemen voiced their support of majority participation in these elections, their actions encouraged the opposite. While officials should have been pleased with a large public turnout at the voting booths, many were made anxious by such a prospect. The enthusiastic turnout at the polling stations suggested that the voting period could even have been extended to midnight, yet it was limited to 9 PM.

5. Such limitations on the voting period lead to serious doubts and questions:

5.1. Does the haste to end the voting period, and the urgency in announcing and certifying the results not demonstrate that the scenario had been planned independent of voter participation and the reality of the ballot boxes?

5.2. Is this not due to concerns that the number of votes would surpass the number of eligible voters in the majority of polling stations? This was the very situation at hundreds of polling stations, where the number of ballots cast was reportedly between 95% to 140% of the population of eligible voters in that district.

5.3. Is it not true that limiting the voting period had the greatest effect on large urban centers and districts where rivals of Ahmadinejad had a larger support base?

5.4. Is this not one of the many ways in which the election was rigged to deprive

the rivals of Ahmadinejad and ordinary citizens of their fundamental rights?

### **Ballot Count and Vote Totals**

1. According to Clause 28 of Statute of the Elections Law, all counting and tallying of votes, as well as preparing the reports in polling stations, should be done by hand, and all documents and sealed ballot boxes should be handed over to the executive committee of the district. The same regulations have provisions on how the local governments should complete the reports, calculate the vote totals, and subsequently announce the results based on the votes in their specific cities to the Election Headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior. It is only on this basis that the Election Headquarters are able to announce the vote results, so that the candidates' representatives in district offices and at the Election Headquarters are able to monitor the process of calculating vote totals and announcing results.

2. In response to official inquiries on behalf of the campaign offices of Mr. Mousavi and Mr. Karoubi, the Ministry of the Interior had announced prior to the election that votes would be counted by hand, and that the computer-based system they had recently designed and installed was only being tested.

3. But in practice, the Ministry of the Interior acted against these regulations and its own mandates, transmitting the voting results online, directly from each voting station to the Ministry's Election Headquarters where they were tallied and announced, skipping the legally required stages of conveying the results to the executive committees and district administrations that were under observation of the candidates' representatives.

4. In addition to the abovementioned infractions (which pose a serious challenge to the announced results), other infractions jeopardize the credibility of the entire electoral process:

4.1 While votes were still being cast in some districts, the Ministry of the Interior

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

indicated the direction that the ultimate results would take by announcing the results of the first 5 million votes.

4.2 The Ministry of the Interior's haste in announcing early results led to an unusually linear proportion in the number of votes announced for the leading candidate and second runner-up, with no blank or void ballots. By the time the results for 30 million votes were announced, these details had been corrected.

4.3 Contrary to legal procedures, the results were announced without prior coordination with the Guardian Council.

5. Nor did the Guardian Council intervene to prevent the continuation of such legal and procedural infractions.

6. Witnessing such obvious infractions, the representatives of candidates Mousavi, Rezaei and Karoubi who were stationed at the Election Headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior prepared a written complaint to the Interior Minister. Seeing that they would be unable to monitor the tallying and announcing of votes, they concluded that their presence at the Ministry of the Interior was of no use, and quit the premises. Copies of the aforementioned letter have been sent to the Office of the Supreme Leader, the Central Supervisory Committee of the Guardian Council, and the Election Headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior.

**Evidence of Preparations to Announce Rigged Election Results**

In the days before the elections, there were many signs of preparations to announce rigged election results. The preparations continued up to the vote count and announcement of results. The most significant indications are:

1. 23 to 24 million votes had been predicted for Mr. Ahmadinejad two days before the election by his supporters, and the results were considered final. Mr. Ahmadinejad's campaign office had announced in a letter of June 20 that "according to reputable and



DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

and definitive reports that we have received, Mr. Ahmadinejad victory is 100 percent guaranteed. Await the echo of *Allah-o-Akbar* throughout Islamic Iran following the vote counts.” What is the source of this certainty? Does it not indicate a predetermined outcome?

2. Cell phone text messaging services—the main means of communication among Mr. Mousavi’s representatives—were disconnected on the day of the election. This despite the fact that the director of the Elections Headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior had denied the possibility of such an occurrence.

3. The telephone lines of Vote Protection Committee offices were disconnected during the most crucial part of the reporting process, namely, as votes were being counted.

4. “Authority and warning” drills were announced by the Minister of Intelligence, as a response to reported threats to national security.

5. The National Radio and Television Network laid the groundwork as early as June 12 (Khordad 22) by announcing the combined results of those qualified in rural areas and small towns.

6. Electoral procedures were changed: contrary to the legal regulations and official statements, vote counts were announced directly to Elections Headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior—without being counted at provincial polling stations, and with no supervision by candidate’s representatives. Even at the Ministry of the Interior, votes were gathered and results announced in the absence of the candidates’ representatives.

7. A large number of voting stamps were distributed—more than twice the number needed—as well as millions of extra ballot slips.

8. There was a shortage of ballot slips at some polling stations, despite the excessive number of slips printed.

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

9. Polling stations were hastily closed, despite repeated requests for extending the voting period.

10. The vote results were announced unusually early, before voting had ended at all polling stations, and in numerical proportion to the final results, and without expected coordination with the Guardian Council.

11. Various supporters of Ahmadinejad, as well as Fars and IRNA news agencies, issued statements regarding the victory of the incumbent before voting had ended at all polling stations.

12. *Keyhan* newspaper finalized the headlines to the next day's paper—announcing Mr. Ahmadinejad's victory—before all polling stations had closed.

13. Various campaign offices of Mr. Mousavi, including his main headquarters, were attacked on the afternoon of the elections.

14. Several members of Mr. Mousavi's campaign were arrested, and the campaign headquarters closed down, in order to prevent the preparing and publicizing of documents relating to electoral infractions.

**Evidence for the existence of a definite plan for the announcement of the engineered election results**

A few days prior to Election Day, there were signs pointing to the existence of a definite plan for the engineering of election results, persisting right up until the time of the collection and announcement of results. The most important indicators are:

1. A prediction of 23 to 24 votes for Mr. Ahmadinejad by his supporters and an announcement of his resolute victory in the election from his headquarters, two days ahead of the election.

2. One of the most important challenges mentioned in the discussion of the Presidential election, is the engineering of the election and the way in which the Ministry of Interior announced information and statistics. The following evidence points to the strong likelihood of extensive cheating in the election:

**Discrepancies in the statistics announced for various provinces, according to towns and ballot boxes:**

1. One of the methods used here is a comparative analysis and the existence of balance between variously recorded statistics, which is a common method employed by financial companies and statisticians, in order to control questionnaires. For example, at the end of each day, year or month, a given company is required to prepare balance sheets and comparative adjustments of various accounts before closing them in such a way that even a single difference between accounts can point to the existence of an aberration in the whole financial operation. The importance of this method rests in the fact that justifiability of statistics and information must be proven in various ways. Now in relation to the subject of the election, considering the fact that statistics announced in various forms were obtained according to certain needs; in order to test the hypothesis of justifiability of statistics and information, the votes of each candidate in various provinces presented in two different categories by the Ministry of State are compared. When the differentiated statistics of the towns of each province (presented on 25/3/1388 on the official site of the Ministry of State) are compared with the differentiated statistics of ballot-boxes (presented on 2/4/1388 on the same site) it can be seen unfortunately, that there is a discrepancy for 24 provinces of the country. This discrepancy is of one vote to 29,000. Therefore, it seems that the differentiated votes of towns are not derived from the total votes of their ballot boxes. This hypothesis becomes more acceptable when the above test is carried out for each town of the provinces. The result of the test at the level of towns also shows a statistical discrepancy

for 78 towns of the country. The total number of votes from those towns whose aberration is proven by this method amounts to 11,175,853 votes.

**Ambiguity regarding the level of participation in provinces, towns and various regions:**

One of the ambiguities in regard to the votes presented by the respectable Ministry of State is that the number of votes exceeds the number of those who were actually registered to vote in certain provinces, towns and counties of the country. For example, at the provincial level, the number of votes in the ballot boxes is 100% higher than the actual number of registered voters in the provinces of Yazd and Mazandaran. When the above test is carried out at a regional level, it shows that the level of participation in 60 towns and 192 counties is more than 100%. This 100% to 211% increase in participation is quite remarkable. In 125 towns, the participation was more than 95%. In response to the unjustifiable increase in participation, the respectable Minister of State claimed that the increased participation in the province of Mazandarn was due to the high number of travelers to this province, while in the province of Yazd, the large student population accounted for the increase, which has no logical basis. With respect to the student demographic as a criterion, the Ministry of the Interior has stated the large number of travelers as the main cause of increase in voter participation in the province of Mazandaran.

The presence of a large number of college students has been stated as the main reason for this increase in Yazd province.

The justification offered is not however founded on any logical basis, since the impact of the number of college students would be much more likely in the province of large cities, such as Tehran, Isfahan, Fars, Azarbayjan Sharghi, etc. and not in Yazd province.

Furthermore, in parts of Yazd province, including the cities of Yazd and Meibod that have the highest density of students, the percentage of voter participation is 84% and

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

90%, respectively. The unusual increase in voter participation mentioned above is observed in parts of the province that do not have high density of students, in contrary to the justification offered by the Minister of the Interior.

With regards to Mazandaran province, the stated hypothesis does not hold strongly enough either, because according to official government statistics, the volume of summer vacationers is higher in provinces like Gilan, and yet such irregularities are not observed in those provinces. Also, the parts of Mazandaran that shows significant increase in voter participation do not correspond to areas of high weekend vacation volumes. Furthermore, due to summer fuel ration being offered in early Tir (late June), university examinations in process, and the public university entrance exam (konkur) around the corner, this volume of traveling on Election Day is relatively unlikely.

Considering all the points mentioned above, the validity of election results in 192 counties faces ambiguity. This practically means 3,898,277 votes out of total vote cast are ambiguous.

On the other hand, even though such a hypothesis at this scale is unreasonable without solid proof, this same hypothesis hints at an organized plan for fraud because:

If we assume ( $n$ ) number of people have traveled from city A to city B, then we must subtract a large number of people from the number of qualified voters in city A. In that case, the total number of votes cast in city A will become larger than the number of qualified voters. In other words, the justification by the Ministry of the Interior leads to seeing the election results in other cities proportionally tainted. Therefore, all cities would have a share in this infection, and that means a systematic fraud is under way. In other words, in order for the Ministry of the Interior's justification to be valid, there must be cities in which qualified voters have not shown desire to vote and the voter participation has been below 60%. This claim is offensive to the people and contradicts the evident pattern throughout the country. This should demonstrate that the dense population in one city consists of the natives of the area.

### **Concentration of votes for one candidate in specific provinces**

In social phenomena and reasonable statistics all numbers must follow a pattern. In statistical analysis, the observations that are far from the general logic of the data are thrown away as outliers. Based on this fact, the concentration of votes for one candidate in one city, county, or village without sufficient reasons, is a clear sign of ambiguity on those votes. One of the most significant instances of this is the concentration of votes for Mr. Ahmadinejad in specific ballot boxes in various provinces across the country, such that in 307 boxes his total votes is above 99%, which indicates clumsily uniform stuffing of the ballot boxes. The number of ballot boxes in which Mr. Ahmadinejad acquired above 95% of the votes totals 2233, equivalent to 1,262,226 votes.

This issue becomes more evident when considering the fact that in some cities' ballot boxes, even the votes of those employed at the campaign centers for the other three candidates are not counted in the per-box results announced, and such vote counts contradicts the reports by supervisors at those ballot boxes.

### **Ballot boxes with total vote counts of a multiple of hundred**

The probability of total vote count in each ballot box being a multiple of hundred is one in a hundred (1/100). On the other hand, voting ballots were provided to voting locations in packs of a hundred. Therefore, if the percentage of boxes with total vote count of a multiple of hundred, in each county or city is above one percent, then that increases the suspicion that the leftover empty ballots are cast for a specific candidate at the end of the election time.

For example, in Roomashgan county of Koohdasht in Lorestan province, in 49% of ballot boxes the total votes cast in each box is a multiple of hundred. The proportion of boxes with total vote count of a multiple of hundred has been 29% in the Koohdasht city of Lorestan, 29% in Bazman county of Iranshahr, 29% in Narmashir county of Bam, 23% in Selseleh city of Lorestan, 20% in Dalfan city of Lorestan, 19% in

Falavarjan city of Isfahan, 18% in Margoon county of Boyerahmad, and 14% in Anbarabad city of Kerman.

### **Comparing the votes in fixed and mobile boxes**

From the beginning, one of the suspicion points was the possibility of large-scale fraud in mobile ballot boxes, due to frequent transfers and less control. The hypothesis that mobile boxes are prone to fraud has been proven in the only instance in which the Ministry of the Interior has provided separate statistics for fixed and mobile boxes. According to the statistics announced by the Ministry of the Interior, in the city of Ghaenat in Khorasan Jonubi province, the percentage of votes for Mr. Ahmadinejad is between 80% to 90% per box among mobile boxes, while from the fixed boxes he captured 40% to 50% of the votes in each box. Furthermore, the level of voter participation in this city has been 101% of all qualified voters. This city can be considered as a sample of the comparison between the statistics from mobile boxes and those of fixed boxes throughout the country.

1. In the city of Dalfan in Lorestan, there are at least 19 ballot boxes in which the percentage of votes for Mr. Ahmadinejad is between 75% to 100%. These boxes do not present even a single void ballot. In most of these boxes, the number of votes for Mr. Karoubi and Mr. Rezai, who are born in the same province of Lorestan, is either zero or one. In some boxes, there are no void ballots and no vote cast for any of the other three candidates, but 100% of the votes have gone to Mr. Ahmadinejad. In this city, voter participation has been 100%.

2. One of the instances of these evidences can be seen in the election results from the city of Anbarabad in Kerman. In that city, the total number of votes cast is 110% of the number of qualified voters and, according to the statistics announced by the Ministry of the Interior, 95% of the votes belonged to Mr. Ahmadinejad. What is worth noting is that precipitancy and excitement of election staff at the Ministry of Interior has led to

DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

some thought-provoking items published on its website for all to see, including the following:

- In some ballot boxes, all the votes cast belong to Mr. Ahmadinejad and the other three candidates do not capture any votes at all. For instance, in the county of Jabalbarez Jonubi, all 307 votes in box number 13, all 700 votes in box number 14, all 335 votes in box number 16, all 600 votes in box number 18, and all 1000 votes in box number 21 belong to Mr. Ahmadinejad.
- In some of the other ballot boxes in this city, the total number of votes for the other three candidates is single digit. For example, in boxes numbered 13, 16, 20, and 30 in the central county, of all the votes cast in these boxes the other three candidates captured only 7 votes in total.

A similar situation is evident in boxes number 3, 4, 7, 11, 19, 22, 24, and 25 in the Jabalbarez Jonubi County and in the box number 3 in the county of Esmaeeli.

SENTRY COMMITTEE OF MR. MIR HOSSEIN MOUSAVI'S VOTES



DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTRY COMMITTEE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MR. MIR HOSSEIN  
MOUSAVI'S VOTES

**Credits for translation:**

Mr. Mohsen Makhmalbaf

BoomGenStudios & Mr. Mahyad Tousi

Mir Hossein Mousavi's supporters on Facebook:

Mahsa Shayan

Lili Afra

Nazilla Rasulzadeh

Negar Afshar

Mahdi Rahimi

Delaram Mirzania

Mostafa taheri

Rashin Mazaherian

Sara mirzakhani

Sara Azad

Rashin Mazaheri

Sousan Poursanati